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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JANICE C. :MARTIN, Widow, GAY-·
LYNN MARTIN, MICHELLE
MART IN, GARY CHAD,VICK
MARTIN, and VAL JAMES MARTIN.Minors by and through their Guardian Ad Litem, JANCE C. MARTIN,.
Plaintiffs and Appellants \ Case No.
'I

182005

vs.
\
LYNN D. CHRISTENSEN and
FARMERS
INSURANCE
EXCHANGE, a California Corporation,
;',
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiffs, Janice C. Martin et al, appeal from an
Order granting the defendants' motion for partial Summary Judgment in the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Stewart M. Hanson presiding.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on the 9th day of September, 1968. After hearing arguments on both plaintiffs' and defendants' motions for summary judgment,
Judge Stewart M. Han.son entered an Order partially
granting the defendants' motion on the 6th day of November, 1968. Subsequently, the appellants filed an
interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 72 ( b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant submits that the Order partially
granting the defendants' motion for Summary J udgment should be reversed, and an order entered that
plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed for in their
Motion for Summary Judgment as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 9 :00 p.m. on or about the Ist
day of December, 1967, plaintiff, Janice C. Martin, and
her now deceased husband, Gary, were pedestrians at
the Southeast corner of the intersection at 3300 South
and 500 East Streets, Salt Lake County, Utah. While
walking on the sidewalk, the plaintiff and her husband
were struck by an automobile being driven by defendant, Lynn D. Christensen, an uninsured motorist.
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As of December 1, 1967, Gary Martin was the
named insured in two ( 2) insurance policies with Deendant Carrier namely specified as Nos. 76-6643-02-14
and 76-6643-00-14, both of which provided coverage
for uninsured motorists. At the time of his death, Gary
.Martin was thirty-six ( 36) years of age and had a reasonable life expectancy of another thirty-eight ( 38)
years; and he was earning approximately Ten Thousand
Dollars ( $10,000) per year.
At the hearing on November 6, 1968, arguments
for Summary Judgment were entered by both plaintiff
and defendant. The defendant argued that the extent
of financial liability of the defendant was limited to
$10,000 for the heirs of Gary Martin, Deceased, and
$10,000 for injuries to Janice C. Martin. In support
of its contention the Defendant relief upon Condition
(7) of PART II, Coverage C, of said insurance policies, which reads as follows:
With respect to any occurrence, accident or
loss to which this and any other insurance policy
or policies issued to the insured by the Company
also apply, no payment shall be made hereunder
which, when added to any amount paid or payable under such other insurance policy or policies,
would result in a total payment to the insured
or any other person in excess of the highest applicable limit of liability under any one such
policy.
On the other hand plaintiff argued that the extent
of financial liability of the Defendant should be found
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to include up to an amount of $20,000 for the heirs of
Gary Martin, deceased, and $20,000 for injuries to
Janice C. Martin for reasons which shall appear herein.
At the conclusion of the hearing the Court found
in favor of the defendant's motion upon reasons contrary to law and repugnant to public policy.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INSURER VOLUNTARILY WAIVED
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 7 O:F
PART II ENTITLED "OTHER INSURANCE
IN THE COMP ANY" BY CONTRACTING
FOR ADDITIONAL COVERAGE AND ACCEPTING A PREMIU.M THEREFOR.
The insurance policies in question are identical with
the exception of the description of the vehicles, and the
dates of issuance. Both policies contained an uninsured
motorist provision, and a provision limiting liability
where there was "other insurance." The situation thus
becomes that Farmers issued a second policy to the
Martins knowing that the "other insurance" condition
in the first policy would invalidate the expected coverage
in the second policy.
Plaintiff respectfully contends that knowledge of
the "other insurance" clause on the part of Farmers plus
acceptance and retention by the company of additional
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premium payments constitutes a waiver of said clause
and that the Respondent should be estopped from
asserting said clause as a defense. See generally 28
Am. J ur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 162. Under the
terms of the first insurance policy, the Appellants wou1a
have received Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000),
the exact amount the defendant admits it owes despite
the existence of a second policy.
In light of above principles and well-settled notions of equity, the lower court was clearly in error
in gran ting the defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT'S GRANTING OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FRUSTRATES THE
PURPOSE OF UTAH'S UNINSURED MOTORIST STATUTE.
Utah Code Ann., 1953, Sec. 41-12-21.1 (1967 Supp.)
sets out certain minimum requirements automobile insurance policies must meet. The requirement under consideration is found in Utah Code Ann., 1953, 41-12-5
( 1967 Supp.) and reads in part as follows:
" ... provided, however, every such policy or
bond is subject, if the accident has resulted in
bodily injury or death, to a limit, exclusive of
interests and costs, of not less than $10,000 because of bodily injury to or death of one person
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in any one accident and, subject to said limit for
one person, to a limit of not less than $20,000 because of bodily injury to or death of two, or more
persons in any one accident, . . . "
The obvious intent of the Legislature in enacting
the Uninsured .Motorist Act was to provide insurance
to policyholders such as plaintiff .Martin against inadequate compernmtion for injuries or death caused by the
negligence of financially irresponsible motorists. Furthermore, the statute sets out only the minimum requirements an insurance policy must meet in this state. The
statute does not prohibit parties from contracting for
more insurance coverage if they so desire, and what
better example of additional desired coverage can there
be than by purchasing a second policy and paying additional premiums?
The
stated in
coverage
death of,
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plaintiff is seeking to recover only the amount
each policy which is the minimum amount of
required by state law for bodily injury to, or
two or more persons in any one accident.

A case almost exactly in point is the case of Robey
v. Safeco Insurance Company of America, 270 F. Supp.
473 (D. Ark. 1967). In Robey the defendant had
issued to plaintiff two insurance policies on two differ·
ent cars.Judge John E. Miller had before him the ques·
tions of the legal effect of the "other insurance" clauses
in the two policies issued by Safeco. Both of the policies .
contained an uninsured motorist provision, and a provision limiting liability where there was "other insur·
ance.

.
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Judge Miller held:
"The 'other insurance' provision in the Safeco
policies are not applicable with respect to each
other. The contention of the defendant that its
liability shoudl be pro-rated between the two
policies is invalid."
Thus, the court held that the liability of the defendant was the sum of the minimum amounts required
by state law under both policies. In essence the court
held in the Robey case that the legislative intent as expressed in the Uninsured Motorist Act required the
insurer to give the stated coverage in each policy regardless of the "other insurance" provisions found in the two
Safeco policies issued to the plaintiff.
It should also be noted that the Arkansas statute
is practically identical with the Utah act. See Ark. Stat.
Ann. Sec. 66-4003 (1966 Repl.) and Sec. 75-1427
( 1965 Supp.). This latter section provides that no policy
or bond shall be effective:

" . . . unless issued by an insurance company
or surety company authorized to do business in
this State ... unless such policy or bond is subject, if the accident has resulted in bodily injury
or death, to a limit, exclusive of interests and
costs, of not less than $10,000 because of bodily
injury to or death of one (I) person in any one
(I) accident and subject to said limit for one
(I) person, to a limit of not less than $20,000
because of bodily injury to or death of two (2)
or more persons in any one (I) ac~ident .
"
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In other words, the court in Robey said the effect
of the issuance of the second policy which also contained
the uninsured motorist clauses was to provide the plaintiff coverage of $20,000/$40,000 for uninsured motorist
protection despite the presence of "other insurance"
clauses in both policies.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons plaintiff respectfully
submits that this Court determine that the lower court
should have rejected defendant's motion for summary
judgment because the ruling was contrary to principles
of equity; was contrary to judicial precedent; and
which, if allowed to stand, would frustrate the expressed
legislative intent embodied in the Utah Uninsured Motorists Act.
~
This court should ~ ~ decision of the lower
court and remand the case back to the District Court
for relief in accordance herewith.
Respectfully submitted,
LOUIS M. HAYNIE
KENTT. YANO
Attorneys for Appellants
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